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FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION OF CONSERVATION IN
AUSTRALIA: COOPERATIVE INTENT
AND POLITICAL REALITY
LUCAS L. BURNS*
1.

INTRODUCTION

Arising in the midst of distinctive political and ecological
climates at different times during the last century, national
conservation regimes in Australia, Germany, and the United States
were nevertheless prompted by the same uniquely modern
concern about the status of threatened wildlife. Despite their
common objective to address this concern, the iterations of national
conservation regimes following the U.S. Endangered Species Act of
1973 (“ESA”)1 are characterized by a diversity of means, even
among countries sharing a common law legal system. Although
other national legislatures enacted a variety of statutes with similar
objectives over the past few decades, the ESA still stands out as an
exceptional model among common and civil law countries alike,
utilizing a highly centralized regime to directly protect threatened
species.
While the counterpart provisions for species protection in an
Australian statute—the Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act of 1999 (“EPBC Act”)—are substantially different
from the ESA in their reach and in their inclusion of state
decisionmaking, perhaps unexpectedly, many provisions in the
comparable German statute are similar to the EPBC Act. These
similarities call to mind the often-dubious distinctions between

* Articles Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law,
Vol. 32; J.D., 2011, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006) (“It is . . .
declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal departments and agencies
shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize
their authorities in furtherance of [these] purposes . . . .”).
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civil law and common law countries, particularly on the level of
specific areas of law. At least within the limited scope of the
conservation regimes examined here, variations between the
means employed in two common law countries—the United States
and Australia—are often greater than those between a common
law and civil law country—Australia and Germany. As this
Comment will show, the reason for this divergence is political:
although the statute establishing the Australian regime was
enacted by a legislature with near-plenary constitutional authority
over environmental matters, its state-centric provisions were
inspired primarily by the political context in which it was enacted.
Nevertheless, the facially divergent Australian and American
statutory regimes have faced similar criticisms after several years
of implementation. Both regimes have been criticized as slow-toreact and either plagued by under-enforcement or unpredictable
enforcement. The similar criticisms of the Australian regime may
be explained by its implementation. The greater cooperative
mechanisms that distinguished the Australian from the American
regime have been underutilized in practice, and as a result
enforcement is burdened by a lessened degree of responsiveness
and is subject to the vacillations of political expediency on a federal
level. These inefficiencies are also characteristic of a highly
centralized conservation regime, which is exemplified by the ESA.
In both cases, the mechanisms for state cooperation are inadequate
or lay dormant, leaving unrealized the potential efficacy of either
regime.
Following more than ten years of implementation of the
Australian statute, this Comment will recount the origins of the
new cooperative conservation provisions, how the failures of its
implementation relate to underutilization of these provisions, and
what can be learned from the failings and successes of the EPBC
Act—one of the most recently enacted federal environmental
statutes.
First, by explaining the constitutional power available to
national legislatures in the environmental arena and the political
considerations prevailing at the time of enactment, the latter will
be shown to have been the primary factor affecting the divergence
of the Australian statute from the mechanisms of the ESA. Second,
the provisions of the three statutes will be compared in order to
highlight the similarities between the Australian and German
regimes and the differences between Australian and American
regimes, with particular focus on the mechanisms for cooperative
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efforts involving the states. Third, this Comment will survey how
the Australian statute as implemented has been subject to criticism
similar to that directed toward the ESA. Finally, this Comment
will contend that the failure of the federal Australian legislators to
utilize the substantial cooperative mechanisms in the new EPBC
Act demonstrates that the cooperative mechanisms in a federal
conservation statute must be accompanied by a robust method for
ensuring their utilization.
2.

THE ECOLOGICAL CONTEXT

As an initial matter, an undeniable aspect of the context in
which national biodiversity legislation arises is, of course, the
presence of biota of particular concern that will be affected by
policy. If the prominence of threatened species varied significantly
between the examined countries, it is conceivable that this alone
might account for the differences between the regimes. This is not
the case.
Threatened endemic species are readily identifiable in the
isolated continent of Australia2 and within the vast range of
wilderness in North America. Australia is home to 7.8% of the
world’s species, most of which are endemic.3 Since the time of
European settlement, the persistence of native populations has
been in steady decline.4 By these indices the importance of an
effective conservation regime is clear.
However, the protection of wildlife from the harmful
encroachment of civilization may intuitively seem an unlikely
concern in long-settled Central Europe. To be sure, little or no true

2 See BEN BOER & GRAEME WIFFEN, HERITAGE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 142 (2006)
(estimating that approximately 85% of flowering plants, 84% of mammals, 45% of
birds, and 89% “of inshore, temperate-zone fish are endemic . . . [to] Australia.”).
3 See ARTHUR D. CHAPMAN, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER,
HERITAGE & THE ARTS, NUMBERS OF LIVING SPECIES IN AUSTRALIA AND THE WORLD 7
(2d ed. 2009), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/abrs/
publications/other/species-numbers/2009/pubs/nlsaw-2nd-complete.pdf (“For
example, 41.3% of the chordates are endemic (including 87% of mammals, 45% of
birds, 93% of reptiles, 94% of frogs) and some 92% of the vascular plants. . . . [T]he
number of Australian species under threat are 246 chordates . . . 1260 vascular
plants . . . ,[and] 32 invertebrates . . . .”). See also id. at 11 tbl. 2.
4 See A Delahunt et al., The National Estate, Forests and Fauna, in CONSERVATION
OF AUSTRALIA’S FOREST FAUNA 245 (Daniel Lunney ed., 1991) (discussing the
potential decline of National Estate areas in Australia).
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virgin forestland remains in Central Europe,5 including Germany.
However, there are populations of species endemic to Germany
presently in decline. About 3,000 ferns and flowering plants are
endemic to Germany, and almost a third are at least at risk of
extinction.6 According to an influential “Red List” published by
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”), in
Germany seventy-five species of flora and fauna are designated as
threatened.7
In contrast, 849 species in Australia and 1157 species in the
United States8 are considered threatened. However, considering
the much smaller total area of Germany, the proportion of
threatened species to the total size of the country is higher than in
the United States, although this does not speak to the density or
specific threat level of populations.9 By these indices, species
5 See, e.g., G. Frank & F. Müller, Voluntary Approaches in Protection of Forests in
Austria, 6 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 261, 262 (2003) (“Except in the Alps and the
inaccessible mountains of the Carpathians and the Balkan range, no true virgin
forests have remained in Central Europe.”) (references omitted).
6 See FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION & NUCLEAR SAFETY,
NATIONAL STRATEGY ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 17 (Jonna Küchler-Krischun &
Alfred Maria Walter eds., 2007) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY] http://www.bmu.de/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/broschuere
_biolog_vielfalt_strategie_en_bf.pdf (specifying that the Red List estimates that
26.8% of endemic plant species and 36% of endemic animal species are currently
at risk of extinction); see also FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION
& NUCLEAR SAFETY, REPORT ON THE STATE OF NATURE BY THE GERMAN FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT FOR THE 16TH ELECTORAL TERM 17 (Ingelore Gödeke & Alexandra
Liebing eds., 2009), available at http://www.bmu.de/files/english/pdf/
application/pdf/bericht_lage_natur_lp_16_en_bf.pdf (estimating that due to the
effects of global warming “about 20 to 30% of all species which have been
assessed . . . will face a higher risk of extinction”).
7 See Biodiversity and Protected Areas—Germany, EARTHTRENDS, 1–2 (2003),
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/bio_cou_276.pdf
(listing twelve higher plants, eleven mammals, five breeding birds, and six fishes
as being designated as threatened in Germany).
8 See INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, TABLE 5: THREATENED SPECIES
IN EACH COUNTRY (TOTALS BY TAXONOMIC GROUP) 4 (2011), available at
http://www.iucnredlist.org/documents/summarystatistics/2011_2_RL_Stats_
Table5.pdf (reporting that 67 plants, 55 mammals, 52 birds, 43 reptiles, 47
amphibians, 103 fishes, 168 molluscs, and 314 other invertebrates are recognized
as threatened in Australia; 243 plants, 37 mammals, 76 birds, 36 reptiles, 56
amphibians, 183 fish, 268 molluscs, and 258 other invertebrates are recognized as
threatened in the United States).
9 See VALUATION AND CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 111 (Michael
Markussen et al. eds., 2005) (“The patchy landscape of Central Europe abounds
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protection is a justifiable priority not only in these common law
countries but in German environmental policy as well.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: ESTABLISHMENT AND
STRENGTHENING OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER THE ENVIRONMENT
When the legislatures of each of the examined countries
enacted comprehensive legislation on a national level, in each case
it was certain that the enactment abided by the constitutional
allocation of legislative power.
However, in Australia the
recognition of this power in the environmental area was recent,
and in Germany the constraints imposed by constitutional law
significantly limited the enactment of a comprehensive
environmental statute.
An examination of constitutional jurisprudence in Germany,
the United States, and Australia reveals that although all three
states are federal polities, the distribution of environmental
lawmaking power between their respective federal and state level
governments varies significantly. The distribution of power in the
Australian and American federal systems is similar, though the
concurrent powers in Australia are much broader; both models are
very different from the cooperative model of federalism in
Germany, which provides for a complex interdependent paradigm
of decisionmaking.
Power is much more concentrated in Germany than in the
United States because of the partial fusion of powers of the federal
council that represents the Länder (states), known as the Bundesrat
(second chamber), and the executive.10
But environmental
legislation has remained largely fragmented.
The German
legislative process, unlike the American and Australian, serves as
an impediment to comprehensive reform since the Länder are
restrained by the necessity of broad agreement before new
environmental policy is enacted.11 This has been an obstacle to

with small, often fragmented populations . . . . Additionally, Germany is very
poor in endemic species, and there are no hot spots of species diversity . . . .”).
10 See R. DANIEL KELEMEN, THE RULES OF FEDERALISM: INSTITUTIONS AND
REGULATORY POLITICS IN THE EU AND BEYOND 79 (2004) (explaining how the
structure of the German government leads to more concentrated power than in
the United States or other EU countries).
11 See Helmut Wiesenthal, German Unification and ‘Model Germany’: An
Adventure in Institutional Conservatism, in GERMANY: BEYOND THE STABLE STATE 37,
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long-sought reforms in the environmental area. The power of the
Bundesrat in Germany generally causes an even higher degree of
fragmentation of power at the federal level than the Australian
model and a lower degree of discretion exercised by the states in
implementing federal policy.12 However, in the area of species
protection, the autonomy the Länder exercise in implementing
federal law more closely resembles the autonomy the Australian
states exercise in this area than the American states.
Regarding specific lawmaking power, the U.S. Constitution,
like the Constitution of Australia, does not allocate the competency
to regulate nature conservation. In either case, the concept of
“environmental conservation” was simply not a part of the
contemporary lexicon. As previously mentioned, in both countries
this area of regulation was traditionally within the competency of
state governments, and remained so because of the residual nature
of state power. Only after judicial interpretation of constitutional
provisions broadened the authority of the federal government to
legislate did it become clear that constitutional challenge did not
threaten the ESA and the EPBC Act.
In the United States, the broad expansion of congressional
authority to legislate occurred long before the enactment of the
ESA. However, the Supreme Court did not clarify specific
authority to enact wildlife regulation under the Commerce Clause
until the 1970s. Even so, at the time of the ESA’s enactment, the
Court had not struck down legislation as an unconstitutional
exercise of the Commerce Clause since the New Deal.13 Thus, it
did not appear that the ESA was in danger of serious constitutional
scrutiny. In 1977, the Court indicated that Congress had broad
power to regulate wildlife under the Commerce Clause in a

52–53 (Herbert Kitschelt & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2004) (describing Germany’s
system of cooperative federalism as limiting autonomy for “bold initiatives” and
thus favorable to the status quo).
12 See KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 20–21 (noting that because “Germany
combines parliamentary government with the existence of a powerful upper
chamber” it provides for less discretion compared to the Australian government).
13 See id. at 59 (explaining that the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Commerce Clause broadly and as such has “not struck down a single federal
regulation claiming to promote interstate commerce since the New Deal”).
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decision that upheld the regulation of fish in state waters.14 Two
further decisions in 1979 reified this holding.15
A somewhat recent constitutional challenge to a regulation
promulgated pursuant to the ESA made clear that Congress has
authority to regulate wildlife pursuant to this power even after the
Lopez decision.16 In Gibbs v. Babbitt, private landowners challenged
a regulation that forbade the “taking” of endangered wolves on
private land.17 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the regulation
was constitutional, since “[t]he taking of red wolves implicates a
variety of commercial activities,” and killing of red wolves in the
aggregate affects interstate commerce.18 This decision confirmed
Congress’ ability to regulate “takings,” even on privately owned
land.
The broadening of federal legislative authority in the
environmental arena was comparatively recent in Australian
jurisprudence. Although matters of land management are vested
in the states, the Constitution of Australia does not explicitly
address the power to enact environmental legislation.19
Like the enumerated powers of Congress in Article 1 of the U.S.
Constitution, Section 51 of the Australian Constitution lists the
“heads of power” originally ceded by the Australian colonies to the

14 See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 286–87 (1977) (holding
that the Federal Enrollment and Licensing Act preempted Virginia state law, and
upholding that Act as constitutional); see also MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J.
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 23 (3d ed. 1997) (noting
that while the fish in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. were migratory, the basis for
finding federal authority was grounded in the vessels’ interstate movement when
searching for fish and transporting the catches back to processing plants).
15 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (holding the definition of
commerce equally extends to federal restrictions on state legislation as well as
congressional action); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63–64 (1979) (holding that the
Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act were valid).
16 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that while
Congress had broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, the power
was limited, and did not extend so far from “commerce” as to authorize the
regulation of the carrying of handguns, especially when there was no evidence
that carrying guns affected the economy on a massive scale).
17 See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
18 Id. at 492–93 (explaining that there is a valid federal scheme for protecting
and conserving “valuable wildlife resources important to the welfare of [the]
country”).
19 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51 (enumerating the powers of the
Parliament).
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Commonwealth Parliament.20
These matters fall within the
“concurrent power” of the Commonwealth. Pursuant to Section
107, state parliaments may legislate in the areas of concurrent
jurisdiction.21 For the most part, since legislative authority in
Australia is held concurrently, unlike the United States there is
high probability of conflict between a valid state law and a valid
federal law,22 in which case inconsistent state legislation is
“invalid.”23 As the environment was not mentioned within the
original “heads of power,” legislation related to environmental
matters was considered within a residual power left to the states.
After the Federation was formed, the Australian
Commonwealth relied on its “trade and commerce” power to enact
a few pieces of species protection legislation, including the
regulation of international trade in endangered birds.24 The very
limited nature of the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals)
Act of 1974, which applied only to decisions involving the
Commonwealth,
reflected
a
narrow
interpretation
of
Commonwealth that was undisturbed until as recently as the
1980s. The anemic trade and commerce power still lacks the
expansive capability of its American counterpart, the Commerce
Clause.25

20 See SURI RATNAPALA, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND
THEORY 204–07 (2d ed. 2007) (describing the Australian scheme of distributing
power into various exclusive and shared competencies).
21 Id. at 206 (“The provision implies that in the absence of exclusive vesting,
State Parliaments may also legislate on subjects within the Commonwealth’s
jurisdiction.”).
22 Id. at 208 (explaining that the Constitution’s response is to give precedence
to federal law through Section 109, which “is activated only when a valid federal
law is in conflict with a valid State law”).
23 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 109 (“When a law of a State is inconsistent
with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to
the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.”).
24 See ALLAN HAWKE, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER, HERITAGE &
THE ARTS, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION ACT 1999: INTERIM REPORT 8 [¶ 2.1] [hereinafter HAWKE INTERIM
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/
publications/pubs/interim-report.pdf
(discussing
the
Commonwealth’s
prohibition on the importation of specific bird species in 1908 and 1909).
25 See Cheryl Saunders, The Constitutional Division of Powers with Respect to the
Environment in Australia, in FEDERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICYMAKING IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 55, 64 (Kenneth M.
Holland et al. eds., 1996) (noting a lack of an Australian equivalent to the
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Compared to the United States, the Australian High Court only
recently began to expand the constitutional role of the
Commonwealth in the environmental arena. The Franklin Dam
Case in 1983 opened the doors to new environmental legislation
pursuant to the “external affairs” power, deciding that the
Commonwealth could act to block a state-approved dam in an area
on the World Heritage List pursuant to the Convention on
Biological Diversity (“CBD”).26 The High Court made it clear that
the Commonwealth could act to implement any obligations under
an international treaty, an expansive recognition of power that has
not been nearly realized in the environmental area to this day. The
legislation upheld in the Franklin Dam Case was also constitutional
pursuant to the “corporations” head of power.27 Since this case,
the Court’s interpretation of the breadth of Commonwealth power
has continued to grow.28
Turning to the division of constitutional lawmaking power in
Germany, although authority to legislate in the area of nature
conservation was not addressed in the original Basic Law for the
Federal Republic of Germany (“Basic Law”) of 1949, an
amendment to the German constitution in 1969 allowed the federal
government to issue “framework” legislation in this area.29

expansive commingling doctrine found in the United States); see also Greg Taylor,
The Commerce Clause—Commonwealth Comparisons, 24 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
235, 246–48 (2001) (explaining the rejection of the doctrine of commingling and
comparing the American interpretation of the Commerce Clause generally).
26 See Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 5 (Austl.) (holding that the
federal legislation was constitutional under Section 51 (xxix)).
27 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51(xx) (detailing that Parliament may
legislate with respect to “[f]oreign corporations, and trading or financial
corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth”).
28 But see GRAEME APLIN, AUSTRALIANS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT 168 (1998)
(“The Federal Government’s environmental role is limited to areas involving its
external or foreign affairs responsibilities, its own property and activities, and
matters delegated to it by the states.”).
29 See Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes [Law Amending Basic Law],
May 12, 1969, BGBL. I at 363 (Ger.), amending GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949,
BGBL. I, art. 75 § 3 (Ger.) (granting a federal competency over “das Jagdwesen,
den Naturschutz und die Landschaftspflege” [hunting, protection of nature and
care of the countryside]); see also KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 82 (2004) (explaining
that under the amendment the federal government “could issue legislation
establishing general principles and goals, but could not issue detailed
regulations”).
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According to Articles 83–87 of the Basic Law, the Länder are
generally responsible for the execution of federal legislation.30
Framework legislation promulgated guidelines on a federal level
that called for the enactment of more specific legislation by the
Länder.31
This feature distinguishes environmental legislation in
Germany from its American and Australian counterparts, as there
is a comparative lack of ability to control the administration
beyond the guidelines set out in regulations and framework law.
However, as a part of the response to a perceived encroachment on
the authority of the Länder, the provision for framework legislation
in the Basic Law was deleted as part of federalism reform in 2006.32
Nevertheless, the German Federal Nature Conservation Act
(“the German Act”), the primary conservation statute in Germany,
was enacted as framework legislation.33 This, therefore, gave the
Länder responsibility to concretize its framework in a way that
would be considered an unconstitutional commandeering of state

30 See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ]
[GG] [BASIC LAW], MAY 23, 1949, BGBL. I, art. 83–90 (describing the specifics of
execution by the Länder in light of federal oversight and commission, and as
pertaining to particular domains such as defense, nuclear energy, air and rail
transport, and posts and telecommunications).
31 See KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 82–83 (“[A] 1972 amendment added waste
disposal, air pollution control, and noise abatement as areas of concurrent federalstate legislative competence.”).
32 See Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes [Law Amending Basic Law],
Aug. 28, 2006, BGBL. I at 2034, art. 1, § 8 (Ger.) (“Die Artikel 74a und 75 werden
aufgehoben” [“Articles 74a and 75 are hereby repealed”].); see also Arthur
Gunlicks, German Federalism Reform: Part One, 8 GER. L.J. 111, 122–23 (2007)
(considering the repeal of Article 75 to be a natural result of the Federal
Constitutional Court decisions that placed significant limits on the federal
government’s power to regulate education under the Article).
33 Gesetz über Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege, Bundesnaturschutzgesetz
[BNatSchG] [Federal Nature Conservation Act], Mar. 25, 2002, BGBL. I at 1193, §
71 (Ger.) [hereinafter German Federal Nature Conservation Act] (“Die
Verpflichtung der Länder gemäß Artikel 75 Abs. 3 des Grundgesetzes . . . im
Übrigen innerhelb von drei Jahren nach dem Inkrafttreten dieses Gesetzes zu
erfüllen” [“The obligation of the federal states according to Art. 75(3) of the
Constitution must be fulfilled . . . within three years after the entry into force of
this Act”].), reprinted in and translated in GERMAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR
PRACTITIONERS 683 (Horst Schlemminger & Claus-Peter Martens eds., Jane
Martens trans., 2d ed. 2004).
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authority in the United States.34 In fact, the only way that Congress
could enact a similar program compelling states to enact
biodiversity legislation would be through conditional spending or
conditional preemption.35
4.

THE PREVAILING POLITICAL CONTEXT AT ENACTMENT

The concerns that gave rise to the examined regimes are of
recent vintage relative to the history of wildlife law generally. The
entire legal history of “wildlife law,” loosely defined, may be
characterized as a global development that begins with basic ideas
about the “ownership” of wildlife that evolve into modern
concerns about conservation of biodiversity.36 The twentieth
century terms “biodiversity” and “conservation” that now
permeate species protection in the regimes compared here
originated recently, relative to the whole evolution of this area of
policy.
Importantly, the incorporation of these terms into floor debates
and statutes reflected a sea change in the popular conception of
man’s relationship to wildlife. This change led to the emergence of
two legal developments: an expansion of the scope of wildlife law
from management to conservation and strengthened authority
over wildlife on a national level.
Despite plenary constitutional authority over environmental
legislation on a federal level, prevailing political concerns
ultimately restrained the mechanisms employed by the Australian
regime. As a result, although the environmental conservation
statutes of Australia, Germany, and the United States have parallel
origins in the movement toward centralized authority over
conservation, the text of the Australian statute is shaped by a
heightened concern for state involvement, while the statutory text
34 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (“The Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program.”) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
35 See Dale D. Goble, The Property Clause: As If Biodiversity Mattered, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1195, 1233 (2004) (explaining that these two cooperative federalism
tactics are constitutional because states have the right not to participate).
36 Anthropocentric concerns about ownership and control dominated wildlife
law until the twentieth century. See Thomas A. Lund, Early American Wildlife Law,
51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 705–06 (1976) (recounting the history of American wildlife
law, beginning with hunting laws based on the free taking principle, which were
considered necessary for human survival in the American wilderness).
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of the ESA remains an artifact of the 1970s fervor for centralized
environmental policy.
4.1. The Twentieth Century: Conservation Objective and Shift from
State to National Law
Prior to the twentieth century, the U.S. federal government did
little through legislation to directly protect species,37 and early
efforts to protect wildlife were carried out by the states. This was
also true of Australia and Germany, despite the fact that there were
early efforts in these countries to form national policy to protect
fauna.38
State legislatures in the United States and abroad were first to
enact substantial policy for the protection of species for reasons
other than their value as game. The pioneering nature of these
laws was the concern their provisions evidenced with the
persistence of populations of flora and fauna in the wild, instead of
the rules regarding capture of wildlife. This marked an important
change in the popular conception of man’s relationship to nature:
man was no longer primarily a hunter partaking of nature’s
unlimited stores, but instead a steward with the power to eradicate
or preserve entire species. This change led to new developments in
the mechanisms by which wildlife law achieved its objectives, and
new concerns about the proper level of government to administer
environmental policy.
When states began to innovate in conservation policy, the
designation of protected areas was an early conservation tool.
National parks were a federal invention in the United States, but in
37 A few federal laws were enacted, such as an 1868 Act prohibiting killing of
certain animals in the Alaskan territory, and the indirect protection afforded by
the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which set aside land to be designated as forest
reserves. See Shannon Petersen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A
Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 467–68 (1999)
(noting that the federal government focused on natural resources outside of state
jurisdiction rather than concentrating efforts on wildlife management).
38 For instance, the ornithologists’ efforts to protect native birds in Australia
proved futile primarily due to a lack of consensus among the states, and the
receptiveness of a few individual state governments to legislation protecting
fauna led the environmental lobby to strategically focus its efforts on state and
territory governments. See DREW HUTTON & LIBBY CONNORS, A HISTORY OF THE
AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT MOVEMENT 40–43 (1999) (adding that a concurrent
response by the environmentalist movement was to “improve public education
strategies”).
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Germany and Australia the states were pioneers in establishing
these areas. National parks in Australia predate the Federation,
and most of the national parks in Australia are still administered
by state authorities.39 Similarly, in Germany, Bavaria enacted
progressive legislation designating Germany’s first national forest,
the Bavarian Forest National Park.40
The German system ensures that the administration of all
national parks is the exclusive responsibility of the Länder. This
particular designation has become more popular in recent years,
leading to the designation of the Kellerwald-Edersee National Park
in the western part of North Hessen.41 Although a hybrid system
could have arisen in the United States in which the federal
government was considered a landowner subject to the several
states’ laws, this conception has been consistently rejected. The
federal government owns, and administers the protection of,
national parks.42
Once legislators in Australia began to perceive the necessity of
increased government intervention in conservation, states utilized
their ability to quickly adopt progressive policies. For example, the
state of Victoria enacted one of the progenitors of comprehensive
conservation legislation in the Federation, again demonstrating the
pioneering nature of state-level legislation.43 The Victoria Flora
and Fauna Guarantee Act of 1988 was explicitly set up with an eye
toward the economic objections associated with listing an
endangered species, and its provisions responded to these

39 See BOER & WIFFEN, supra note 2, at 227 (noting that the Australian
Government administers only a few parks in the Territories).
40 Jens Brüggemann, National Parks and Protected Area Management in Costa
Rica and Germany: A Comparative Analysis, in SOCIAL CHANGE & CONSERVATION 71,
80 (Krishna B. Ghimire & Michel P. Pimbert eds., reprint 2000) (1997) (presenting
a brief history of the park).
41 See Tobias Hellenbroich, The Designation of National Parks in German Nature
Conservation Law, in VALUATION AND CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 133,
134 (Michael Markussen et al. eds., 2005) (noting that “other areas in Germany are
being recommended national park status”) (citing FÖNAD 1997, 285ff).
42 See Goble, supra note 35, at 1202–03 (referring to congressional and judicial
affirmations of the Federal Government’s dominion over public land).
43 See KRISTIN M. JAKOBSSON & ANDREW K. DRAGUN, CONTINGENT VALUATION
AND ENDANGERED SPECIES: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 11 (1996)
(crediting the Act with creating a process for individuals and groups to nominate
an ecological entity or community for protection).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012

03 BURNS (DO NOT DELETE)

1010

4/18/2012 3:14 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:4

concerns. Action statements and management plans explicitly took
into account social and economic considerations.44
The state’s willingness to make a concession—incorporating
considerations favored by development interests, although
producing a statute less attractive to environmental interests,
allowed the state to enact progressive conservation legislation long
before similar viable national legislation was enacted.
The establishment of state agencies in Australia to oversee the
implementation of comprehensive policy also predated equivalent
national agencies.
Since the 1960s all territory and state
governments in Australia have established agencies charged with
the administration of environmental matters, with varying names
and functions.45 However, this is not true of the state-centric
German system. There, the Länder have generally not established
special authorities for the administration of nature protection, and
have instead integrated this function in existing authorities
responsible for inner administration.46
Until the 1960s and 1970s, state legislation in these three
countries was primarily relied upon for the enactment of
conservation policy, and the national legislatures lacked an
impetus to consolidate in the federal government the power to
legislate on conservation matters. This changed, beginning with
comprehensive federal environmental policy in the United States.
Environmental legislation entered a new era during the 1960s and
1970s, as evidenced by several federal comprehensive statutes in the
United States and abroad.47 This may be viewed as an inevitable
outgrowth of the expanding conservation consciousness as well,
since federal usurpation of legislative authority in this area is an

44 Those listings are recommended by a government-independent statutory
body, which reduces delays for economic concerns. See id.
45 See APLIN, supra note 28, at 167–68 (remarking however that governments
retain the power to overrule the decisions and actions of such agencies).
46 See SCHLEMMINGER & MARTENS, supra note 33, at 142 (discussing the
authorities in Germany).
47 In Europe, the prominence of environmental concerns was recognized
when the Council of Europe declared 1970 the “European Year of Nature
Conservation.” See ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, MANUAL OF EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 182–83 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing a variety of measures that
European countries have taken to protect the environment on the federal level,
such as Austria’s federal restrictions on the animal and plant trade).
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obvious way to attempt to achieve one of the most prominent
desiderata of any conservation regime: uniformity.
The beginning of the movement to centralization was the
enactment of the ESA, designated by the Supreme Court as “the
most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered
species ever enacted by any nation.”48 One historian has justifiably
called it the “Magna Carta of the environmental movement.”49
Although not the first piece of legislation to focus on the direct
protection of specific species, at the time of enactment, the ESA
was certainly the most extensive legislation to focus on the
persistence of threatened species of wildlife. Further, the ESA and
similar national comprehensive efforts to preserve and restore
biodiversity reflected the modern concern for the existential value
of biodiversity for the sake of biodiversity.50 This concern is a
distinguishing feature of the modern era of nature conservation
that is shared by all of the subsequent national regimes.
Following the enactment of the ESA in the United States, in
Germany the Federal Nature Conservation Act was one of several
pieces of legislation that formed a suite of environmental
protection regime in the 1970s. At the time of its passage, members
of a new reform-oriented coalition government recognized the
successes of United States environmental initiatives on a federal
level.51 The original Federal Nature Conservation Act was enacted
on December 20, 1976, and has been amended four times.
4.2. The EPBC Act: Federalism Concerns Shape the National
Conservation Statute in Australia
For several decades following the enactment of federal
conservation regimes abroad, Australia did not follow suit. This
position was sustained in part by unique concerns about the

48 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (reaffirming that the
U.S. Congress intended for the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to direct all
Federal agencies to act in the consideration of protecting endangered animals).
49 Interview by Lisa McRae with Kevin Starr, Cal. State Librarian Emeritus, in
Sacramento, Cal., in WATER ON THE EDGE (Water Education Foundation 2005).
50 See HUTTON & CONNORS, supra note 38, at 196 (explaining that for
conservationists, biodiversity became “almost an absolute value in itself”).
51 See KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 82 (2004) (attributing a series of ecological
crises and the popular responses to them as another factor in the coalition
government’s initiatives).
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exercise of federal power. To the frustration of the states and
territories, the Australian Commonwealth government acted upon
its newly clarified powers in the environmental arena during the
1980s with vigor, halting various activities within states through
coercive means.52
The suddenness of the federal government’s appearance within
the concurrent legislative sphere of the states, along with the
unilateral nature of its actions, generated political resistance from
the state governments that was not seen in either Germany or the
United States. Tension arose after the Queensland government
refused to halt logging activity in one such newly designated
World Heritage Site, which it was ordered to do in accordance
with a Commonwealth ban approved by the High Court.53
Subsequently, the states opposed similar actions taken by the
Commonwealth pursuant to its constitutional authority.54
These instances of conflict were factors influencing a decision
by the Hawke Government to undertake efforts to improve
intergovernmental cooperation, which would influence future
legislation.55 The states also began to recognize the concurrent (as
opposed to coordinate) nature of environmental policy, evidenced
by statements of state-level Premiers calling for cooperation.56
After a series of conferences beginning in 1990, representatives

52

Site.

An example would be threatening to nominate an area as a World Heritage

53 See KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 111–12 (mentioning the statements by the
Queensland government that the Commonwealth government would have to
enforce the measures with national military and police forces).
54 These included conflicts over the tropical rainforest in North Queensland,
efforts to prevent woodchipping in Tasmanian forests, and the Kakadu National
Park in the Northern Territory. See Aynsley Kellow, Thinking Globally and Acting
Federally: Intergovernmental Relations and Environmental Protection in Australia, in
FEDERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING IN AUSTRALIA,
CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 135, 146 (Kenneth M. Holland et al. eds., 1996)
(recording that in all these cases of State and Territory opposition, a useful model
for environmental management in the Australian Federal system failed to
emerge).
55 See KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 114 (blaming the lack of federal
infrastructure required for quotidian “implementation and enforcement” of
environmental policy).
56 Premier Nick Greiner of New South Wales gave a speech in 1990 calling for
a more cooperative approach with the Commonwealth. See Kellow, supra note 54,
at 149 (considering Greiner’s call for cooperation to be the most influential due to
his position as a leader in the Liberal party).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss4/3

03 BURNS (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/18/2012 3:14 PM

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION

1013

from all nine governments signed an Intergovernmental
Agreement on the Environment (“IGAE”) in 1992, which set out
environmental areas of responsibility in order to avoid duplication
of decisionmaking.57 As an example of the effect of this agreement,
pursuant to the IGAE, the Commonwealth is now obligated to
consult with the State before proposing an area for listing.58
The development of national policy on conservation
culminated in the enactment of the EPBC Act on July 17, 2000. The
final bill received ardent criticism from some members of the
Australian Greens (“the Greens Party”), an environment-focused
political party formed in 1992 with its roots in state-level greens
parties,59 due to a perceived “disempower[ment of] the federal
government,”60 as well as opposition from the Australian Labor
Party (“ALP”). A majority held by a center-right political party
nevertheless was able to claim the triumph of passing the most
comprehensive national environmental assessment regime to
date.61
57 See APLIN, supra note 28, at 170 (specifying the avoidance of redundant
State and Federal decisionmaking as a primary concern); see also BOER & WIFFEN,
supra note 2, at 93 (noting the more uniform acceptance of which areas of heritage
protection fall within Federal and within State and Territory jurisdiction following
the passage of the IGAE).
58 See G. M. BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 340 (4th ed. 1995)
(referring to the previous tension between the Commonwealth’s ability to propose
areas for protection despite State objections and the Commonwealth’s capacity to
enforce protective measures).
59 See IAN THOMAS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: AUSTRALIAN PRACTICE IN THE
CONTEXT OF THEORY 38 (2007) (discussing the reasons for the formation of the
Australia Green Party).
60 See Cth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 April 1999 (Bob Brown, Senator,
Tas) (Austl.) (indicting State governments as retarding Australia’s efforts to
develop the economy and fight global warming, in a speech given during the
Second Reading on the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Bill 1998 [1999]). Senator Bob Brown of Tasmania provided perfervid criticism of
the bill and the proceedings generally. See also Cth, Parliamentary Debates,
Senate, 22 June 1999 (Robert Hill, Senator, SA and Min. for the Env’t & Heritage)
(Austl.) (“I would have thought that the Australian Greens would be in here
demanding contemporary environment laws for this country. But of course they
are not interested in the structure of government; they are not interested in the
cooperative models. All they are interested in is confrontation . . . .”).
61 See id. (“[F]or the first time we also included a bill for biological
conservation in this country to protect our biodiversity. Its time had come.
Regrettably the Australian Labor Party, although it had entered into the
international convention on biodiversity and the national strategy, had not got
around to upgrading Commonwealth law in this regard.”).
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This landmark environmental legislation replaced its
predecessors in the area of national species protection62 with a
regime that incorporates extensive enforcement and listing
mechanisms, which are detailed in the next Section. The EPBC
Act’s explicit objectives in the area of biodiversity are very similar
to those of the ESA, though the EPBC Act employs different means
to reach those objectives.
5.

THE RESULTING PROVISIONS: DECENTRALIZED AUSTRALIAN AND
GERMAN REGIMES AND A CENTRALIZED AMERICAN REGIME

The resulting federal statutes share similar objectives, but the
ESA stands out as a singularly centralized system, owing its
strength to less prevailing political suspicion, at the time of its
enactment, about the encroachment of a powerful federal
government on state interests related to the environment. Further,
in Australia and Germany, state-level cooperation is particularly
important, as the effects of one state’s dissent are not diffused by
the cooperation of forty-nine other states. The small number of
states makes intergovernmental politics a prominent feature of the
statutory provisions,63 and the restrained federal power is
manifested in provisions that take a more indirect route to species
protection than the ESA.
As regimes born from the same general concerns for the
existential value of biodiversity, their explicit objectives in the area
of biodiversity share many similarities. A central textual objective
of the ESA was to “conserve,” which encompasses both protection
and recovery, and is a concept that resonates throughout its
counterparts abroad. Section 3(1)(c) of the EPBC Act requires the
promotion of the conservation of biodiversity, which, when
viewed in light of 3(2)(e)(i), includes not only preservation but also
the recovery of endangered species. Article 1 of the general
provisions of the German Act begins: “In view of their own value .
. . nature and landscape both inside and outside the areas of
human settlement shall be conserved, managed, developed and,

62 The EPBC Act replaced the Endangered Species Protection Act 1993 and
the Australian Wildlife Protection Act 1998. See Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (Austl.).
63 See Kellow, supra note 54, at 139 (discussing intergovernmental
relationships in Australia).
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where necessary, restored in order to safeguard on a lasting basis .
. . fauna and flora . . . .” The common objective of conserving
biodiversity is what distinguishes the compared provisions from
other environmental policy.
An important distinction is the similar omnibus nature of the
provisions of the EPBC Act and the German Act when compared to
the ESA. Where the ESA is concerned exclusively with the
protection of species, nature protection generally is the goal of the
other statutes, including the conservation of biodiversity. Even
beyond “nature” the German Act is concerned also with the
general protection of “landscapes” (Landschaftspflege).64
The ESA’s eighteen sections are simple to navigate compared to
the maze of cross-references between the general provisions of the
German Act and the substantive provisions. However, the
German Act is outdone in this regard by the exceptionally complex
EPBC Act, which repealed more than a half a dozen pieces of
Commonwealth environment legislation and incorporated their
areas of concern.65 The EPBC Act incorporates language and
concepts from the CBD and a multi-layered approach to species
protection, recognizing the value of genetic diversity, species
diversity, and ecosystem diversity.66
The German and Australian regimes, because of the
international obligations in which they arose, take a broader
approach to biodiversity conservation that also includes the
designation of protected areas other than critical habitat. These
designations are the true source of their power to protect
biodiversity. The EPBC Act is primarily thought of as a national
scheme for Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIAs”),67 which
in the United States were accomplished through the National
Environmental Policy Act. The conservation power of the EPBC
64
65

Act).

German Federal Nature Conservation Act, supra note 33, art. 13(1).
See BOER & WIFFEN, supra note 2, at 142 (discussing the impact of the EPBC

See id. (discussing the EPBC Act).
See ALLAN HAWKE, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER, HERITAGE &
THE ARTS, THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT ACT: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
OF THE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999, at 18
[¶¶ 119, 120] (2009) [hereinafter HAWKE FINAL REPORT], available at
http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/publications/pubs/finalreport.pdf (recommending a national environmental management system to aid
in efficiencies of the environmental impact assessment).
66
67
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Act originates from these assessments. Unlike the U.S. version,
assessments are required for even non-federal actions, and contain
substantive requirements.
The procedure for assessment in the EPBC Act specifies seven
“matter[s] of national environmental significance,” which are each
in some way supported by the heads of power, as well as two
exceptions. The exceptions allow for greater cooperation with the
state governments; the assessment or approval of any project that
falls under state “bilateral agreements” may be delegated to the
state authorities.68
By way of these assessments, limitations on the federal power
to directly protect species through listing and “takings” provisions
did not preclude the Australian government from enacting a form
of legislation that may prove to be the most effective method of
halting development to preserve biodiversity. Where takings of
non-federal land were considered a constitutional exercise of
Congress’ power in Gibbs,69 the Australian courts have not yet
recognized such expansive Federal authority. As a result, under
Section 196(1)(d), a necessary element of liability is “the member
[of a species or ecological community] is in or on a Commonwealth
area.”
However, the EPBC Act indirectly accomplishes a similar result
by designating nationally listed threatened species and ecological
communities as one of the “matter[s] of national environmental
significance” that may require approval from the Federal Minister.
Under the EPBC Act, consultation is required if an “action has, will
have, or is likely to have, a significant impact on a matter of
national environmental significance.” But unlike Section 9 of the
ESA, “significant impact” does not contemplate the taking of a
single plant or animal, but rather contemplates actions that, for

68 See Lansen v Minister for Env’t & Heritage (2008) 174 FCR 14, 22 (Austl.)
(“[T]o achieve its objects, the EPBC Act strengthens intergovernmental
cooperation, and minimises duplication, through bilateral agreements (s 3(2)(b))
and provides for the intergovernmental accreditation of environmental
assessment and approval processes (s 3(2)(c)). However, in terms of process,
timeliness is important in the overall scheme of the EPBC Act.”).
69 See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming the
constitutionality of regulations limiting takings).
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example, will possibly “lead to a long-term decrease in the size of a
population.”70
In Germany, protected areas similarly figure prominently in
the conservation regime, although designation is generally the
responsibility of the Länder. The categories of protected areas, such
as nature reserves and national parks, are laid down in Sections 12
through 19 of the German Act. Some critics might suspect that the
state-level authority to designate national parks would be affected
by parochial decisionmaking. However, this system has yielded
enviable results,71 though often fragmented by political
boundaries. A substantial portion of protected areas in Germany
are national parks.
A common feature of all three regimes is the listing of
threatened species on both a state and federal level, although the
listing process and content varies. The lists maintained by the
Länder, and to a greater degree the Australian states, are generally
more comprehensive than national lists in both countries.
Although state agencies in the United States also maintain lists of
threatened species, these lists generally include few state-specific
species.
In Germany, listing decisions on a national level are in part
encumbered by procedure. Where listing decisions under the ESA
must undergo a notice and comment procedure but do not require
further approval, species given “special protection” under Article
52 may be designated “with the consent of the Bundesrat provided
that the species concerned are native species whose survival in
Germany is endangered due to human acts or activities,” if they

70 AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER, HERITAGE & THE ARTS, MATTERS
OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE: SIGNIFICANT IMPACT GUIDELINES 1.1, at

10 (2009), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/publications/pubs/
nes-guidelines.pdf.
71 With regard to IUCN Management Protected Areas, which are specifically
“dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity” as of 2003,
31.7% of the total land area of Germany is designated as a protected area,
compared to 7.5% of Australia or 15.8% of the U.S. Compare Biodiversity and
Protected Areas—Germany, supra note 7, at 1, with Biodiversity and Protected Areas—
Australia, EARTHTRENDS, 1 (2003), http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/
country_profiles/bio_cou_036.pdf, and Biodiversity and Protected Areas—United
States, EARTHTRENDS, 1 (2003), http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/
country_profiles/ bio_cou_840.pdf.
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are not already listed under an applicable Directive.72 These
restrictions on listing provide less flexibility for the Federal
Minister in listing decisions.
Like the ESA, the regulations passed pursuant to the German
Act provide for only two levels of protection: “special protection”
and “strict protection.”73 A national Red List is issued from the
federal government by the Ministry for the Environment
(Bundesministerium für Umwelt or BMU), but the Länder maintain
extensive Red Lists as well, which serve as a “data source for
national red lists.”74 This results in considerable fragmentation, as
the land lists are much longer than the national lists and provide
differing designations for different species. The limited number of
status designations established in the German Act contrasts with
the broad spectrum of designations available under the EPBC Act.
The existence of this spectrum may be less important in Germany
where considerable conservation resources provided by the
Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (Bundesamt für
Naturschutz or BfN) and state level ministries may be directed
toward a comparatively manageable number of species.
The concern for restraining the Australian Commonwealth’s
power produced yet another variation on listing decisions. Listing
in Australia is a fragmented and complicated system. There are
inconsistencies between state-level regimes, where the majority of
species are listed.75 Not only are threatened species divided into
degrees, but “ecological communities” and “key threatening

72 German Federal Nature Conservation Act, supra note 33, art. 52. Species
listed in Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 are incorporated through
Art. 10(2)(10). See Council Directive 92/43, art. 10, 1992 O.J. (L 206) (EC).
73 See WISIA Online—An Overview, WISIA, § 2, http://mail.azl-inc.com/
Einleitung.en.html (last updated July 1, 2008) (providing explanation regarding
status of protection).
74 For example, of about forty thousand animal and plant species of Lower
Saxony ten thousand species are listed as threatened. See Rote Listen, NLWKN,
http://www.nlwkn.niedersachsen.de/master/C6645300_N5512577_L20_D0_
I521158.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) (translated).
75 See Species Information Partnerships: Sharing Knowledge on Threatened Species,
AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T ENV’T & HERITAGE, (2006), http://www.environment.gov.au/
soe/2006/publications/emerging/species-listing/pubs/species-listing.pdf (last
visited Apr. 14, 2012) (explaining that because “different jurisdictions manage
threatened species according to different laws . . . it is difficult to compare
threatened species lists across jurisdictions”).
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processes”76 are to be maintained by the Minister. Particular listing
decisions are generally within the sole discretion of the Minister,77
and six categories of threatened species are recognized for listing.
The prominence of state governments in Australia, as in
Germany, naturally leads to the need for cooperation in order to
accomplish conservation goals. In Australia, this takes the form of
bilateral agreements between the states and the federal
government, which are an integral part of the EPBC Act.78 State
accreditation pursuant to the bilateral process has been
implemented to reduce duplication.79
The Minister is granted the power to enter into a bilateral
agreement on behalf of the Commonwealth in Section 45(1). As
part of the accreditation process, a copy of the agreement must be
“laid before” each House of Parliament,80 and the agreement will
fail if either House passes a resolution disallowing the agreement
within fifteen sitting days after notice.81
As an example, a bilateral agreement between the Queensland
government and the Commonwealth allowed the state to assess the
controversial Traveston Dam project, which had the potential to
adversely impact a matter of national significance—the nationally
listed Australian lungfish. However, the final decision was not
delegated to the state authorities. On December 2, 2009 the Federal
Minister denied approval of the project to the chagrin of state
officials.82

76 See Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s
188(3) (Austl.) (“A process is a threatening process if it threatens, or may threaten,
the survival, abundance or evolutionary development of a native species or
ecological community.”).
77 This does not include “ecological communities” recognized as threatened
in State or Territory lists pursuant to Section 185, which “are to be added.”
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 185 (Austl.).
78 Bilateral agreements are set out in Sections 44–65. Environment Protection
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 44–66 (Austl.).
79 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3(2)(b)
(Austl.) (“[To achieve its objects, the Act] strengthens intergovernmental
cooperation, and minimizes duplication, through bilateral agreements.”).
80 Id. at s 46(4).
81 Id. at s 46(6).
82 See Press Release, Minister for the Env’t, Heritage & the Arts, Traveston
Dam Gets Final No (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/
minister/archive/env/2009/pubs/mr20091202a.pdf (describing the Federal
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In Germany, since implementation is in the hands of the Länder,
provisions that specifically mandate interstate cooperation in part
alleviate concern about fragmentation in the designation of
protected areas. Importantly, Article 17 of the German Act calls for
cooperation among the Länder in developing the required
“landscape plans,” which fulfill international obligations83 and
provide for the protection of wild flora and fauna.84
In
implementing measures to “monitor” important ecosystems, the
Federal Government and the Länder “shall provide mutual support
to one another.”85 This cooperation among the Länder in planning
will likely be essential to a new national focus to establish a “Green
Belt” of protected area occupying the region that once bordered
either side of the former Iron Curtain.86
Turning finally to the United States, although there was much
concern over the intrusion of federal authority into state
prerogatives in the debate over the passage of the ESA, the
provisions for state involvement were half-hearted.87 The Act
includes a weak mandate that “Secretary shall cooperate to the
maximum extent practicable with the States,” and Section 6 does
provide for the formation of broad “cooperative agreements.” The
content of these agreements, however, is unclear and the Section as
a whole is confusing.88 The impact of these agreements on

Environment Minister’s concern that going forward with the dam project would
threaten the conservation of biodiversity).
83 See German Federal Nature Conservation Act, supra note 33, art. 32
(“Articles 32 to 38 serve the establishment and protection of the European
ecological network ‘Natura 2000’ . . . . The federal states shall meet their
obligations under Council Directives 92/43/EEC and 79/409/EEC . . . .”).
84 See id. art. 14(1)(4)(b)–(c) (providing for the protection of wild flora and
fauna).
85 Id. at art. 12(3).
86 See NATIONAL STRATEGY ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 6, at 112
(detailing plans to conserve and protect the “Green Belt” along the former Iron
Curtain as part of the country’s natural heritage and also as a historical
monument).
87 Legislators like Representative Dingell, a key sponsor of the final bill,
assured detractors that the ESA would not preempt the states from enacting their
own biodiversity legislation. See Petersen, supra note 37, at 474.
88 See MICHAEL ALLEN WOLF, STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN
UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE 332 (2005) (pointing out that although Section 6(g)
appears to conceivably allow less-restrictive state “take” provisions, Section 6(f)
appears to conflict with this by preempting such provisions).
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conservation is minimal. This is in part due to Congress’ neglectful
appropriation for the purpose of the federal fund established by
Section 6(i),89 but is also certainly a reflection on the weakness of
state influence combined with plenary congressional power.
6.

IMPLEMENTATION: HOW THE AUSTRALIAN STATES RETAINED
AND THEN LOST THEIR AUTHORITY OVER SPECIES PROTECTION

The species protection provisions of the EPBC Act have
generally received scathing criticism after the first decade of
implementation.90
As a result of excessive administrative
discretion and broad interpretation of matters that fall within the
assessment authority of the Commonwealth, critics claim that the
regime has been implemented in an unpredictable and ineffectual
manner. Some of the most prominent criticisms of the regime
include:
lack of political will for effectual enforcement,
unpredictable enforcement, inefficient amendment to lists, and
politically-motivated decisions regarding listing and final project
approvals. These shortfalls are linked to the underutilization of
state accreditation processes, which legislators included to carry
out the cooperative intent of the EPBC Act.

89 See 1 DALE D. GOBLE ET AL., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY:
RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 8 (2005) (discussing the purpose of the
section).
90 See Andrew Macintosh & Debra Wilkinson, Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act: A Five Year Assessment, at vii (Austl. Inst., Discussion
Paper No. 81, 2005) [hereinafter Macintosh & Wilkinson, A Five Year Assessment],
available at https://www.tai.org.au/file.php?file=discussion_papers/DP81.pdf
(“In almost all areas, the regime has failed to produce any noticeable
improvements in environmental outcomes.”); Andrew Macintosh, Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act: An Ongoing Failure 2 (Austl. Inst., 2006)
[hereinafter Macintosh, An Ongoing Failure], https://www.tai.org.au/
documents/downloads/WP91.pdf (finding no evidence of significant
improvement in the operation of the EAA regime); Andrew Macintosh & Debra
Wilkinson, EPBC Act—The Case for Reform, 10 AUSTRALASIAN J. NAT. RESOURCES L.
& POL’Y 139 (2005) (criticizing the species protection provisions of the EAA regime
and recommending a switch to landscape assessments by way of reform); Stephen
Keim, The EPBC Act Ten Years On: the Gunns Method of Assessment Case as a Key
Indicator: notes for a QELA Seminar held on Monday 29 June 2009, at 12, available at
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/qela_epbc_complete__21_06_09.pdf (“The
EPBC Act looked green and shiny, ten years ago. With the wisdom of experience,
in the words of the post punk music movement, it may be time ‘to rip it up and
start again.’”).
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6.1. Commonwealth Implementation of the Assessment Regime
The notion that assessment decisions are more strictly applied
when left to federal decisionmakers may be called into question by
the history of the EPBC Act’s implementation. The common
refrain, in the United States and abroad, is that states should not be
trusted because they are “pro-development.”91 However, in
Australia, the Commonwealth’s political will to enforce the
assessment provisions of the EPBC Act has also been questioned.92
The susceptibility of enforcement to vacillations in political will
arises in part due to the broad discretion of the Australian
Environment Minister in the assessment process.
Although the Minister receives a large number of referrals, the
Minister has only found a few to be controlled actions,93 and the
vast majority are eventually approved.94 Although the low
number of actions considered “controlled” is consistent with the
91 This was a refrain from the opposition during the Senate debates over
bilateral agreements. Senator Margaret Reynolds, a Labor member from
Queensland, candidly expressed her distrust of state decisionmaking. See Cth,
Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June 1999, 5959 (Margaret Reynolds, Senator,
Qld) (Austl.) (“Commonwealth environment powers are far too narrowly defined.
I have no problem with saying, ‘I don’t trust the states.’ I do not trust state
governments. They are smaller, they are more parochial and are far more likely to
act in a self-interested way.”).
92 See KAREN BUBNA-LITIC ET AL., BIODIVERSITY, CONSERVATION, LAW &
LIVELIHOODS: BRIDGING THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE 294–95 (2008) (since only two of
the fourteen reported cases brought before the courts under the EPBC Act were
commenced by the federal government, “a question about the political will to
enforce the EPBC Act arises”); Macintosh, An Ongoing Failure, supra note 90, at 3
(noting that the EPBC has rarely been enforced and that it has instead been used
for political purposes); Humane Soc’y Int’l, Submission to the Review of the
Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999,
at 19 (2008) [hereinafter Humane Soc’y Int’l Submission to the EPBC Act Review],
available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/submissions/pubs/
182-humane-society-international.pdf (listing efforts “thwarted by a lack of
political will and a lack of resources . . . and in several cases in the past overt
political interference.”).
93 See Macintosh & Wilkinson, A Five Year Assessment, supra note 90, at 8 [§
3.2] (finding that a relatively low proportion of referrals are declared to be
controlled actions).
94 See id. at 12–14 [§ 3.4] (recommending amendments to the EPBC Act, partly
to lessen administrative discretion in enforcing the Act, greater enforcement of its
existing provisions, and increasing funding to further the Act’s environmental
policies); 2 DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER, HERITAGE & THE ARTS, ANNUAL REPORT
2007–08, Appendix A (2008) (providing detailed statistics on historical referrals
and approvals).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss4/3

03 BURNS (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/18/2012 3:14 PM

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION

1023

cooperative purposes of the EPBC Act because this may simply
leave these decisions to the states, the conspicuously low number
of denials may also be seen as an indictment of the potency of the
regime. Poor enforcement due to a lack of political will is
exacerbated by a lack of financial resources. Facing a problem
familiar to critics of the ESA, the relevant Australian
Commonwealth department is underfunded.95
Intermittent enforcement has also contributed to the perception
that the Commonwealth implementation of the EPBC Act is
ineffective and tainted by political motivation. This perception
was apparent in the content of submissions to the 2009 statutorily
mandated Independent Review of the Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act (the “Independent Review”).96 For
example, the Western Australian Government’s submission was
critical of enforcement under the EPBC Act, since it is
uncoordinated and seems to “react in response to public
complaints.”97
With regard to the assessment mechanism, despite active
litigation, it appears that the EPBC Act has at best created an
unpredictable layer of approval above state processes. To date,
there have been few successful prosecutions under the assessment
provisions of the EPBC Act.98 Since the meaning of “significant

95 See Lee Godden & Jacqueline Peel, The Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (CTH): Dark Sides of Virtue, 31 MELB. U. L. REV.
106, 136 (2007) (identifying chronic underfunding as a continuing obstacle to
effective administration of the environmental impact assessment in a 2006 Senate
inquiry which considered amendments to the EPBC Act); Humane Soc’y Int’l
Submission to the EPBC Act Review, supra note 92, at 22–23 (arguing that funds to
the Act’s relevant section should be significantly increased).
96 See HAWKE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 24, at 27 [¶ 2.108] (highlighting a
public sentiment that significant political interference exists and that the
Commonwealth Government should assume a more substantial role to ensure
that environmental standards are not compromised by political considerations).
97 Submission of Peter Conran, Dir. Gen., Gov’t of W. Austl. Dep’t of the
Premier & Cabinet, to Allan Hawke, EPBC Act Review Secretariat, Dep’t of the
Env’t, Water, Heritage & the Arts, ch. 21, para. 2 (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter W.
Austl.
Response
to
the
HAWKE
INTERIM
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/comments/pubs/117-wagovernment.pdf.
98 See Andrew Macintosh, Australia’s National Environmental Legislation: A
Response to Early, 12 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 166, 174 (2009) (noting that
Greentree has been the only successful case thus far under the Act’s assessments
provisions).
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impact” remains ambiguous,99 and the courts have demonstrated
willingness to impose burdensome penalties for unapproved
actions that are later found to be “controlled,” Commonwealth
environmental assessment referrals are now part of almost every
significant project’s due diligence efforts. Attempts by the Minister
to work with state governments to create exemptions to triggering
have been rebuffed by the courts.100 These triggers can result in
steep penalties for the farming and fishing industry101 and have yet
to be overturned in federal court.102
Many of the Environment Minister’s project approvals appear
to have been influenced by considerations of political expediency,
which calls to attention a danger of allowing too much discretion
in any environmental assessment regime. The so-called “Bald Hills
Debacle” is a ready example of a national decisionmaker yielding
to political pressure instead of making decisions based on
prescribed factors. After several years of routine approval of wind
farm proposals under the EPBC Act assessment process,
Environment Minister Ian Campbell denied approval of the Bald
Hills wind farm project in Victoria because of its likely effects on
the critically endangered orange-bellied parrot. This was despite
the fact that the most accurate calculation at the time arrived at the
conclusion that the wind farm would result in “one dead parrot

99 The first case under the EPBC Act was Booth v Bosworth, (2011) 114 FCR 39
(“The Flying Fox Case”). Booth involved the electrocution of flying foxes on a
lychee farm—foxes had destroyed 50% of previous year’s crop. A substantial fine
was levied against the farmer successfully prosecuted under the EPBC Act. Id.
The outcome of this case resulted in anxiety among farmers about the threat of
nuisance litigation. Open Letter to Farmers: Act Designed to Protect, HERBERT RIVER
EXPRESS (Austl.), Nov. 8, 2001, at 9.
100 See Humane Soc’y Int’l v Minister for Env’t and Heritage (2003) 126 FCR 205
(holding that Ministerial Guidelines, purporting to offer various exemptions from
EPBC Act review for state permit-holders, exceeded statutory authority).
101 See, e.g., Minister for Env’t & Heritage v Warne [2007] FCA 599 (holding that
a fine of AUD 25,000 imposed on a fishing operation was within the permissible
range of appropriate penalties); Greentree v Minister for Env’t & Heritage (2005) 144
FCR 388 (holding a fine of AUD 450,000 imposed on a farming operation was well
below the maximum allowable and properly reﬂected the deliberate nature of the
contravention).
102 See Minister for Env’t Heritage & the Arts v Rocky Lamattina & Sons Pty Ltd
(2009) 167 LGERA 753 (doubling the penalty on appeal from the original and
agreed-upon AUD 110,000 to AUD 220,000).
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every thousand years.”103 In fact, the state assessment process had
been accredited on a one-time basis to assess the impact of the
wind farm and its report concluded that the adverse effects were
negligible. This state-level assessment was eventually vindicated
when, facing public outrage, the Minister was allowed to reassess
the project and reversed his decision.104
Admittedly, counter-examples do exist. In contrast to the Bald
Hills Debacle, the Minister recently blocked a state-approved
project with truly foreseeable impacts on threatened species.
Reminiscent of the “Snail Darter case” in the United States in terms
of financial impact,105 former Environment Minister Peter Garrett
utilized the assessment provisions of the EPBC Act to block the
approval of a major project:
a AUD 1.8 billion dam in
Queensland.106
The Queensland government approved the
“Traveston Crossing Dam” proposal after extensive assessment
subject to 1,200 conditions,107 but Garrett ultimately rejected the
controversial project.108 Garrett based his decision on the potential
adverse impacts on threatened species, including the vulnerable
Queensland Lungfish.
Unlike the Bald Hills Debacle, the loss of habitat from
inundation, although theoretically mitigated by the agreed-upon
conditions, was a concern within the realm of reasonable

103 James Prest, The Bald Hills Wind Farm Debacle, in CLIMATE LAW IN
AUSTRALIA 230, 242 (Tim Bonyhady & Peter Christoff eds., 2007).
104 See
Wind Farm Decision Welcomed, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 21, 2006,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/wind-farm-decisionwelcomed/story-fn3dxiwe-1111112723860 (noting that Victoria’s Planning
Minister Justin Madden has welcomed federal Environment Minister Ian
Campbell’s belated approval of the project after the Minister’s early opposition,
which Mr. Madden described as politically motivated and “more about appeasing
opponents to the wind farm in the marginal federal seat of McMillan than about
the migrating parrots”).
105 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158–62 (1978) (involving the
use of Section 7 of the ESA to block the construction of a dam threatening a
species of fish called Snail Darters).
106 See Jessica Marszalek, Traveston Dam Receives State Approval, THE AGE, Oct.
6, 2009, http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-national/traveston-damreceives-state-approval-20091006-gl23.html (detailing the state’s approval of the
dam).
107 Id.
108 See Press Release, supra note 82 (explaining that Minister Garrett denied
approval because the impact on threatened species would be excessive).
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probabilities.109 In other words, this was arguably an example of
an action that would in fact have a “significant impact” on a
“matter of national environmental significance”—threatened
species. Political motivations also appear less likely given that the
Minister’s decision denied the pleas of a fellow Australian Labor
Party member, the Queensland Premier.110 This denial reveals that,
at least when political motivations do not figure prominently into
the decisionmaking, the EPBC Act may be used as an effective
barrier against matters legitimately classified as “matters of
national environmental significance.”
Although shifting control over environmental decisions from
state to national governments has often been justified by
accusations of parochial decisionmaking at the state level and bias
in favor of industry, Commonwealth decisions under the EPBC Act
have not been immune from these influences. Not only do
economic considerations explicitly figure into decisionmaking, but
the recent amendments to the EPBC Act are also intended to
benefit “development interests,”111 and the Commonwealth
government has been accused of “pro-development bias.”112 There
are even accusations that the Ministers have “abused” the process
to benefit commercial interests.113
Political motivations
109 See Submission of Stuart E. Bunn, Director, Austl. Rivers Inst., Griffith
Univ., Traveston Crossing Dam, Mary River, SE Qld: QWI Response to Reviewers
Report III: Reply, to Dep’t of the Env’t, Water, Heritage & the Arts, at 3 (2009),
available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/notices/assessments/2006/
3150/pubs/traveston-dam-further-advice-prof-bunn.pdf (expressing concerns
about the suitability of the proposed inundated area of the dam as aquatic
habitat).
110 See Rosemary Odgers, Bligh Warns No Traveston Dam Means Higher Water
Prices, COURIERMAIL.COM.AU, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.couriermail.com.au/
news/queensland/bligh-warns-no-traveston-dam-means-higher-waterprices/story-e6freoof-1225796433876 (“[Queensland Premier] Bligh has told State
Parliament that the dam was ‘absolutely critical’ to the region’s future water
security.”).
111 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) § 122
(Austl.).
112 See Godden & Peel, supra note 95, at 138 (commenting that bringing an
action under the EPBC Act in Australia’s Federal Court exacts high litigation costs
on pro-environmentalist plaintiffs, thereby discouraging federal judicial
enforcement of the Act); see also Macintosh & Wilkinson, A Five Year Assessment,
supra note 90, at 11 (2005) (explaining that “lack of political will” has contributed
to a low refusal rate).
113 See Humane Soc’y Int’l Submission to the EPBC Act Review, supra note 92,
at 19 (arguing that there has been an “overt political interference and abuse of
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dramatically affect enforcement due to the broad discretion
accorded the Environment Minister, and contribute to
Commonwealth enforcement that is inconsistent with statutory
purposes.114
6.2. Listing Decisions Under the EPBC Act
Listing in Australia since passage of the EPBC Act remains
divided between seven governments. There are inconsistencies
between state and territory regimes, where the majority of species
are listed,115 which has been a source of criticism. However, this
fragmentation was the intended result, even following the passage
of comprehensive national legislation, in order to benefit from the
flexibility of separate state listing decisions and to accommodate
the limits on protection against “takings.” Since direct takings
under the EPBC Act remain proscribed exclusively within
Commonwealth land, lists maintained in each state and territory
provide needed protection on state land.
The primacy of the states in listing has in many ways benefited
the responsiveness of threatened species lists. Commonwealth
threatened species lists have been slowly populated and less
inclusive. On the national level, 444 fauna, 1342 flora, and 53
communities are listed.116 As of the date of the Independent Review,
since the enactment of the EPBC Act absorbed the previous list,
under the new regime the Commonwealth added “238 species, 12

process”, and noting that the 2006 amendments “legitimized the delays and
specifically enabled opportunities for politicization of the process”).
114 See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1805
(2008) (noting “[m]ost scholars agree that political processes tend to generate
suboptimally lax environmental regulation” because of the lobbying power of
commercial interests); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 114 (2006) (“Every environmental law, regulation,
implementation and enforcement decision is influenced by the political incentives
of regulatory stakeholders.”).
115 See AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T & HERITAGE, supra note 75, at para. 1
(noting that the Australian and State and Territory Governments each maintain
lists of threatened species).
116 See Species Profile and Threats Database, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T SUSTAINABILITY,
ENV’T, WATER, POPULATION AND COMMUNITIES, http://www.environment.gov.au/
cgi-bin/sprat/public/sprat.pl (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) (providing information
about species and ecological communities listed under the EPBC Act).
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[key threatening processes] and 25 ecological communities . . . .”117
These figures may be compared with those of a single state, New
South Wales, where a list for a regime limited to the state’s
boundaries includes 295 fauna, 637 flora, 36 key threatening
processes, and 102 communities.118 Notably, the more listings on
the Commonwealth level, the closer the regime approaches the
geographic reach of ESA Section 9 takings, since listings are
“matters of national environmental significance,” and “triggers”
for these matters have been broadly interpreted. For this reason,
although the sluggish Commonwealth pace indicates that listing
should not be consolidated, given the broad interpretation of
“triggers,” slower Commonwealth listing is paradoxically a benefit
to reduced duplication and efficiency.
The response to the Independent Review submitted by the
Western Australia Government notes that species listed by the
Commonwealth have generally tracked the state and territory
listings of threatened species.119 Some state or territory statutes,
like the Threatened Species Conservation Act of 1995 in New South
Wales, likewise provide for immediate consideration of listing
species already listed through the EPBC Act.120 This reciprocity is a
benefit of multiple listing processes. A state or the Commonwealth
may be able to immediately protect a species within the ambit of its
jurisdiction, while other government entities with less pressing
needs to protect the same species may consider categorizing the
species under a different priority level.
Notably, the experience of environmental groups with states
and territories in listing decisions has anecdotally been favorable,
especially when compared with submissions to the

HAWKE FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 73 [¶ 2.81].
See Species, Populations & Ecological Communities of NSW, THREATENED
SPECIES, http://www.threatenedspecies.environment.nsw.gov.au/index.aspx (last
visited Feb. 27, 2012).
119 See W. Austl. Response to the HAWKE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 97, at ch.
23 (“The concern about the operation of bilateral assessment agreements in
circumstances where the proponent was closely linked with the State or Territory
government and there could be a perceived bias or conflict of interest is
acknowledged.”).
120 See Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW) s 9 (Austl.), available at
http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/fullhtml/inforce/act+101+1995+FIRST+0+#
pt.2-div.1-sec.9 (explaining the “listing of nationally threatened species and
ecological communities”).
117
118
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Commonwealth.121
The attitude toward Commonwealth
submissions for listing has been described as “infuriating.”122 The
existence of multiple lists is important to accommodating the proenvironmental benefits of environmental groups’ familiarity with
and favorable opinion of state processes.
It appears that the Commonwealth listing process, like other
aspects of the EPBC Act, has not avoided the taint of politically
expedient decisionmaking.123
Decisions favorable to interest
groups and the Environment Minister’s veto over listing
assessment have resulted in a meager few listings.124 The design of
some state regimes resists these pressures.
Where the
Commonwealth Minister plays a dominant role in listing approval,
in New South Wales the Minister may only delay the final decision
of the Scientific Committee.125 The resulting efficiencies in state
listing provide some justification for relying in part on state lists,
despite the resulting fragmentation.
Listing primarily at a state level, though inherently creating
fragmentation, has resulted in a flexible national regime in which
states are able to quickly list and de-list species, ecological
communities, and key threatening processes. The Independent
Review notes that changes to state and territory listings “outstrip[]
the capacity of the Commonwealth to keep up.”126 Perhaps the
most prominent example of a disparity between state and
Commonwealth lists is the ongoing battle over the listing of the

121 See Humane Soc’y Int’l Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the
Operation of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, at 6,
(Sept. 22, 2008), available at http://www.hsi.org.au/editor/assets/admin/HSI_
EPBC_Senate_Submission_Sept08.pdf (“[P]rocesses to list threatened ecological
communities and threatened species under the NSW . . . and the Victorian . . .
[Acts][] run comparatively smoothly and efficiently.”).
122 Id. at 12; see also Macintosh & Wilkinson, A Five Year Assessment, supra note
90, at 16–19 [§ 3.6] (suggesting that the listing process is ineffectual and exploited
for political reasons).
123 See Macintosh, supra note 98, at 175–78 (explaining why listing processes
are political by design).
124 See id. at 175 (describing the “reasonably robust listing process”).
125 Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW) s 23A (Austl.), available at
http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/fullhtml/inforce/act+101+1995+FIRST+0+#
pt.2-div.3-sec.23a (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
126 HAWKE FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 74 [¶ 2.83].
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koala,127 which is listed as vulnerable in New South Wales and
Queensland, but is not yet listed under the national EPBC Act list.
An agile state-centric listing process conserves resources by
facilitating swift protection tailored for the unique populations in
each state, and easier de-listing when a population is no longer
threatened in a certain state.
7.

CREATURES OF THE STATES: THE CONCEPTUAL REASONS FOR
STATE INVOLVEMENT

The consensus is that the American and Australian species
protection regimes have produced sub-optimal results. Criticisms
are tied directly to a central deficiency of these regimes as
implemented: the alienation of the states from meaningful
involvement in the administration of conservation policy. The
history of the Australian conservation regime provides examples of
both the advantages of state involvement and disadvantages of a
centralized conservation regime.
7.1. Advantages of State Primacy in Administration of Conservation
Policy
The enactment of progressive or at least cutting edge state
conservation policy is an advantage of incentivizing state
participation in developing species protection policy. Where the
ingenuity of state processes has been harnessed, cutting edge
policy has been enacted before passage on a national level is
attainable.
For example, a prominent criticism of the Commonwealth’s
operation of the EPBC Act has been legislators’ resistance to use its
potential to implement climate change policy.128 Although this
Comment does not purport to evaluate the wisdom of any policy

127 See
Koala Decision Postponed, CANBERRA TIMES, Oct. 31, 2011,
http://www.canberratimes.com.au/environment/conservation/koala-decisionpostponed-20111031-1mrw1.html (describing the controversy over the listing of
the koala).
128 See, HAWKE FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 10 [¶ 65] (explaining that some
submissions included managing the threat to biodiversity through regulation of
climate change); see also Keim, supra note 90 (“It is ironic that, in an age of concern
about climate change, Australia’s national environment impact assessment statute
has nothing to say and nothing to do concerning the impact of new developments
in contributing to climate change.”).
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addressing climate change, it is a ready example of a cutting edge
conservation policy that remains difficult to enact on a national
level in any form. However, the flexible state legislatures in
Australia began to implement climate change policy through
conservation provisions many years ago.129
Although the
piecemeal adoption of this legislation may be unsatisfying to
proponents of climate change laws, the states have been much
quicker to adopt these contentious policies than the national
legislature. In New South Wales, where the name of the former
Department of Water and Energy was appended to include
“Climate Change” in 2009,130 anthropogenic climate change was
listed as a key threatening process as early as 2000.131
Even aside from these developments, in many ways the state
governments have generally pressured the national government to
develop stricter and more cutting edge legislation. This crosspollination is an example of the “learning function” of overlapping
environmental statutes.132 These developments are particularly
interesting since the reverse was predicted in a study referring to
conservation policy in the United States.133 In the submissions and
responses to the Independent Review, several submissions suggested
that the Commonwealth adopt stricter or more progressive state
policies.

129 See Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism,
3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 42 (2009) (state activity in area of climate change may
“prod the federal government into action”).
130 NSW Government Reform, N.S.W. GOV’T, DEP’T PRIMARY INDUSTRIES, OFF.
WATER, http://www.water.nsw.gov.au/Department-of-Water-and-Energy/dwe/
default.aspx (established effective 1 July 2009).
131 See Anthropogenic Climate Change—Key Threatening Process Listing, N.S.W.
GOV’T OFF. ENV’T & HERITAGE, http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/
threatenedspecies/HumanClimateChangeKTPListing.htm
(explaining
the
findings of the New South Wales Scientific Committee and its rationale for adding
Anthropogenic Climate Change as a key threatening process to the Threatened
Species Conservation Act); see also HAWKE FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 111–18
[¶¶ 4.81–4.145] (discussing climate change under the EPBC Act).
132 See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 108, 122–23 (2005) (“Similar, but often slightly varied legal regimes,
allow for some experimentation in implementation and enforcement, as well as
mimicking of successes.”).
133 See A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (1995)
(“Innovative state and local attempts to promote biodiversity are driven by the
need to comply with federal mandates, primarily the Endangered Species Act.”).
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For example, in its Response to the Interim Report, the
Government of Western Australia suggested that the
Commonwealth could respond to climate change by following the
state’s example and adding it to the list of key threatening
processes.134 With regard to listing, the New South Wales
Government suggested a decoupling of the assessment of risk and
the prioritization to mirror the operation of the listing process
under New South Wales legislation.135 This way, the process
would include scientific concerns while excluding management
concerns.136 The national legislature has yet to follow these
recommendations.
Although the Commonwealth likely does have some influence
on state policy, the Australian example demonstrates that states
may be the vanguards of progressive or cutting edge policy, at
least where environmental concerns are prominent in the public
consciousness and state-level regimes are well-developed. Aside
from the suggested implementation of climate change policy
through a new matter of national environmental significance—
which would have the undesirable effect of removing sole state
authority over an even broader range of actions—the
Commonwealth regime will likely benefit from state innovations
through future amendments.
7.2. Proper Role of Federal Administration and Ensuring State
Involvement
In the face of Commonwealth encroachment, the Australian
states have demonstrated a need for allowing greater state control

134 See W. Austl. Response to the HAWKE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 97, at ch.
8 (explaining the impact climate change has on biodiversity and things that can be
done to counter those effects).
135 See Response Submission of John Lee, Dir. Gen., N.S.W. Gov’t, Dep’t of
Premier & Cabinet, NSW Gov’t Response to the Interim Report of the
Independent Review of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act
1999, to Allan Hawke 5 (Sept. 18, 2009) [N.S.W. Gov’t Response to HAWKE INTERIM
REPORT], available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/comments/
pubs/116-nsw-government.pdf; but see HAWKE FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at
122–23 [¶¶ 5.5–5.10] (this idea was rejected by Hawke).
136 See N.S.W. Gov’t Response to HAWKE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 135
(“This review aims to examine the way the agencies interact . . . in order to
streamline assessment and decision-making while ensuring strong environmental
outcomes.”).
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of species protection policy. States have been at the forefront of
progressive environmental policy since Federation and have
agilely listed and de-listed species. As a slow-moving federal
behemoth, it is easy to scorn the Australian regime. However, the
benefits of the regime recommend it as a second, limited level of
species protection above state processes. The Australian model has
not demonstrated the shortcomings of a truly cooperative species
protection regime, but has rather exhibited the failings of a
lukewarm, quasi-centralized regime.
Concessions for state control are unattractive to those coveting
legislative jurisdiction as broad as the effects of environmental
impacts can be imagined. But a regime that ensures state processes
remain above an acceptable standard should assuage the concerns
of all but the most dogmatic advocate of centralized regulation.137
In a truly cooperative system, the inefficiencies associated with
fragmentation are theoretically offset by the cross-pollination
“learning” synergies mentioned above, as well as other benefits.138
Due to judicial interpretation, the Australian and U.S.
Constitutions no longer provide for state administration of
conservation policy. The history of implementation in Australia
demonstrates that mechanisms for state involvement in a
conservation statute may remain dormant because of discretion
over their utilization. In order for conservation regimes to fully
harness the benefits of state involvement, either statutes must
make state participation discretionary and follow through by fully
utilizing these provisions, or legislators must design robust
provisions, ex ante, mandating meaningful state involvement.
A conservation regime may, of course, simply compel states to
comply with minimum federal requirements. But where state
governments in Australia have been empowered to enact and
administer conservation policy independently, state legislators
have surpassed national standards and pressured the national
legislature to enact cutting edge policies. In Australia, this
empowerment arose out of recognition, on the part of legislators
and various constituencies, that states have had and should
continue to have a significant role in species protection.

See supra note 60 (noting criticism by Senator Brown of Tasmania).
See supra Section 4.2 (describing environmental advocates’ positive
experiences with state and territory listing processes).
137
138
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CONCLUSION

In its formative years, the EPBC Act, originally shaped by
political pressures into a cooperative model, was partially divested
of its restraints on the Commonwealth government through
judicial interpretation of its assessment mechanisms and
underutilization of cooperative provisions.
Whether or not
Australian legislators decide to cabin the scope of Commonwealth
authority under the EPBC Act, a decade of implementation
demonstrates some of the detrimental effects of federal
encroachment upon well-developed state conservation regimes.
However, “cross-pollination” synergies and other benefits arising
out of the Australian model indicate the potential of a truly
cooperative species protection regime. In the debate concerning
the proper allocation of authority over conservation, the benefits of
ensuring independent state involvement deserve recognition.
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